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Abstract—We consider the network reliability problem in
wireless sensor networks secured by the heterogeneous ran-
dom key predistribution scheme. This scheme generalizes
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme by considering the cases when the
network comprises sensor nodes with varying level of resources;
e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads. The scheme induces the
inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted G(n;µ,K, P ). We
analyze the reliability of G(n;µ,K, P ) against random link fail-
ures. Namely, we consider G(n;µ,K, P, α) formed by deleting
each edge of G(n;µ,K, P ) independently with probability 1−α,
and study the probability that the resulting graph i) has no
isolated node; and ii) is connected. We present scaling conditions
onK , P , and α such that both events take place with probability
zero or one, respectively, as the number of nodes gets large. We
present numerical results to support these in the finite-node
regime.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Security, Inhomo-
geneous Random Key Graphs, Reliability, Connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of low-cost,
low-power, small sensor nodes that are typically deployed
randomly in large numbers, with application areas as diverse
as military, health, environmental monitoring, etc [1]. In
most cases, WSNs are deployed in hostile environments, e.g.,
battlefields, making it crucial to use cryptographic protection
to secure sensor communications. Therefore, significant ef-
forts have been devoted to developing methods for securing
WSNs, and random key predistribution schemes have been
widely accepted as feasible solutions in the face of the
unique challenges of WSNs. Namely, limited computational
capabilities, limited transmission power, lack of a priori
knowledge of deployment configuration, and vulnerability
to node capture attacks; e.g., see [2]–[5] for a detailed
discussion on security challenges in WSNs and solutions
based on key predistribution. In this paper, we consider a het-
erogeneous key predistribution scheme introduced recently
by Yag˘an [6] as a variation of the classical Eschenauer-Gligor
(EG) scheme [2]. The heterogeneous key predistribution
scheme accounts for the cases when the network comprises
sensor nodes with varying level of resources, e.g., regular
nodes vs. cluster heads, which is likely to be the case for
many WSN applications [7]. According to this scheme, each
sensor belongs to one of r priority classes that controls
the number of cryptographic keys assigned to them. More
specifically, each of the n sensors is independently assigned
to class-i with probability µi > 0, for each i = 1, . . . , r;
obviously we have
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Sensors from class-i are
each given Ki keys selected uniformly at random from a
pool of size P . Then, pairs of sensors that have at least one
key in common can communicate securely after deployment.
With µ = {µ1, . . . , µr} and K = {K1, . . . ,Kr}, we let
G(n,µ,K, P ) denote the random graph induced by the
heterogeneous key predistribution scheme. This model was
referred to as the inhomogeneous random key graph in [6],
wherein, zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes and
connectivity are established.
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the reliability
of secure WSNs under the heterogeneous key predistribu-
tion scheme. In particular, to account for the possibility
that links between two sensor nodes may fail (e.g., due
to random failures, adversarial attacks, etc.), we apply a
Bernoulli link-failure model to the inhomogeneous random
key graph G(n;µ,K, P ). Namely, we assume that each link
in G(n;µ,K, P ) is operational with probability α and fails
with probability 1 − α, independently from others. This
models random attacks as well as random failures due to
sensor malfunctioning or harsh environmental conditions.
Let G(n;µ,K, P, α) denote the resulting random graph
that contains all operational links in G(n;µ,K, P ). The
network reliability problem is concerned [8], [9, Section 7.5]
with deriving the probability that G(n;µ,K, P, α) exhibits
certain desired properties – that captures the ability of the
network to continue its services – as a function of the link
failure probability 1−α. Here, we focus on two standard and
related properties that the network i) has no isolated node,
and ii) is connected. For arbitrary graphs with fixed size n,
deriving these probabilities are known [10], [11] to be #P -
complete, meaning that no polynomial algorithm exists for
their solution, unless P = NP . Given that it is not feasible
to derive them, we study the asymptotic behavior of these
probabilities as n gets large, when the model parameters are
scaled with n; the finite-node case is also considered via
simulations.
Our contributions are as follows. We present conditions
on how to scale K,P and the link failure probability α
such that the network G(n;µ,Kn, Pn, αn) is connected
with probability approaching to one and zero, respectively,
as n grows unboundedly large. We establish an analogous
zero-one law for G(n;µ,Kn, Pn, αn) to have no node that
is isolated (i.e., that has zero edge). These sharp results
are likely to be useful in dimensioning the heterogeneous
scheme, namely controlling the key ring parameters (µ,K),
and key pool size P such that the network has a desired
level reliability against link failures. A particularly surprising
conclusion derived from our results is that network reliability
is tightly dependent on the smallest key ring size used in the
network; see Section III-A for details.
Our results complement and generalize several previous
work in the literature. In particular, we complement the work
[12] that studies the reliability of secure WSNs against a
fixed number k of link failures; in our case the number
of failed links can be unboundedly large. Our results also
contain as special cases the zero-one laws for connectivity in
inhomogeneous random key graphs [6] and reliability results
in homogeneous random key graphs [13]; see Section III-B
for details.
All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalences
are considered with the number of sensor nodes n going
to infinity. The indicator function of an event E is denoted
by 1[E]. We say that an event holds with high probability
(whp) if it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. In compar-
ing the asymptotic behavior of the sequences {an}, {bn},
we use the standard Landau notation, e.g., an = o(bn),
an = w(bn), an = O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and an = Θ(bn).
We also use an ∼ bn to denote the asymptotic equivalence
limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
II. THE MODEL
The heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme
introduced in [6] works as follows. Consider a network
of n sensors labeled as v1, v2, . . . , vn. Each sensor node
is classified into one of the r classes, e.g., priority levels,
according to a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr}
with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Then, a class-
i node is assigned Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly
at random and without replacement from a key pool of size
P . It follows that the key ring Σx of node vx is a random
variable (rv) with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)−1
, S ∈ PKi ,
where tx denotes the class of vx and PKi is the collection
of all subsets of {1, . . . , P} with size Ki. The classical
key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor [2]
constitutes a special case of this model with r = 1, i.e.,
when all sensors belong to the same class and receive the
same number of keys; see also [14], [15].
Let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr} and assume without loss of
generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr. Consider a random
graphG induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that
a pair of nodes vx and vy are adjacent, denoted by vx ∼G vy ,
if they have at least one cryptographic key in common, i.e.,
vx ∼G vy if Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅. (1)
The adjacency condition (1) defines the inhomogeneous
random key graph denoted by G(n;µ,K, P ) [6]. This model
is also known in the literature as the general random inter-
section graph; e.g., see [12], [16], [17]. The probability pij
that a class-i node and a class-j node are adjacent is given
by
pij = P[vx ∼G vy | tx = i, ty = j] = 1−
(
P−Ki
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
) (2)
as long as Ki + Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki + Kj > P , we
have pij = 1. Let λi denote the mean probability that a
class-i node is connected to another node in G(n;µ,K, P ).
We have
λi = P[vx ∼G vy | tx = i] =
r∑
j=1
pijµj . (3)
To account for the possibility that links between two sensor
nodes may fail, e.g., due to random failures, adversarial
attacks, etc., we apply a Bernoulli link-failure model to
the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n;µ,K, P ): With
α ∈ (0, 1) let {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote independent
Bernoulli rvs, each with success probability α. Then the
link between sensors vx and vy is deemed to be operational
(i.e., up) if Bxy(α) = 1, and not operational (i.e., down) if
Bxy(α) = 0. Put differently, every edge in G(n;µ,K, P ) is
deleted independently with probability 1− α1.
Let G(n;µ,K, P, α) denote the resulting random graph
that contains all the operational links in G(n;µ,K, P ). To
simplify notation, we let θ = (K,P ), and Θ = (θ, α). In
G(n;µ,Θ), distinct nodes vx and vy are adjacent, denoted
vx ∼ vy , if and only if they are adjacent in G(n;µ,K, P )
and the edge vx ∼G vy is operational (i.e., has not failed). By
independence, the probability of an edge between a class-i
node and a class-j node in G(n;µ,Θ) is then given by
P[vx ∼ vy | tx = i, ty = j] = αpij .
Similar to (3), we denote the mean edge probability for a
class-i node in G(n;µ,Θ) as Λi. It is clear that
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαpij = αλi, i = 1, . . . , r. (4)
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is
fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities
µ1, . . . , µr. All other parameters are scaled with n.
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We refer to a mapping Θ = K1, . . . ,Kr, P, α : N0 →
N
r+1
0 × (0, 1) as a scaling if
1 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (5)
for all n = 2, 3, . . .. We note that under (5), the edge
probability pij is given by (2).
1An interesting direction for future work would be to consider a heteroge-
neous link-failure model, where the link between a type-i and type-j node
fails with probability 1− αij .
A. Results
We first present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated
nodes in G(n;µ,Θn).
Theorem 3.1: Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
Θ : N0 → N
r+1
0 × (0, 1) such that
Λ1(n) = αnλ1(n) ∼ c
logn
n
(6)
for some c > 0. We have
lim
n→∞
P
[
G(n;µ,Θn) has
no isolated nodes
]
=
{
0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1
The scaling condition (6) will often be used in the form
Λ1(n) = cn
logn
n
, n = 2, 3, . . . (7)
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0.
Next, we present an analogous result for connectivity.
Theorem 3.2: Consider a probability distribution µ =
{µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling
Θ : N0 → N
r+1
0 × (0, 1) such that (6) holds for some c > 0.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] =
{
0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1
under the extra conditions that
Pn ≥ σn, n = 1, 2, . . . (8)
for some σ > 0 and
αnp11(n) = ω
(
1
n
)
. (9)
Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.2) states that G(n;µ,Θn)
has no isolated node (resp. is connected) whp if the mean
degree of class-1 nodes (that receive the smallest number
K1,n of keys) is scaled as (1 + ǫ) logn for some ǫ > 0.
On the other hand, if this minimal mean degree scales as
(1 − ǫ) logn for some ǫ > 0, then whp G(n;µ,Θn) has
an isolated node, and hence not connected. These results
indicate that the minimum key ring size in the network
has a surprisingly significant impact on the reliability of
G(n;µ,θn). This is more clearly seen under the additional
assumption that λ1(n) = o(1) which gives [6, Lemma 4.2]
λ1(n) ∼
K1,nKavg,n
Pn
where Kavg,n =
∑r
j=1 µjKj,n denotes the mean key ring
size. Using this in (6), we see that for fixed mean number
Kavg,n of keys per sensor, network reliability is directly
affected by the minimum key ring size K1,n. For example,
reducing K1,n by half means that the smallest α for which the
network remains connected is increased by two-fold, which
then reduces the largest link failure probability 1−α that can
be sustained by a similar order.
The resemblance of the results presented in Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.2 indicates that the absence of isolated
nodes property and connectivity property are asymptotically
equivalent for G(n;µ,Θn), similarly with some well-known
random graph models; e.g., inhomogeneous random key
graphs [6], ER graphs [9], and (homogeneous) random key
graphs [14].
We remark that conditions (8) and (9) are enforced mainly
for technical reasons and they are only needed in the proof
of the one-law of Theorem 3.2. These conditions are likely
to hold in real-world WSN implementations. In particular,
(8) should hold in practice to ensure the resiliency of the
WSN against node capture attacks [18], while (9) is needed
as otherwise the network would be trivially disconnected [6,
Section 3.2].
B. Comparison with related work
Our main results extend the work by Yag˘an [6] who estab-
lished zero-one laws for the connectivity of inhomogeneous
random key graph G(n,µ,K, P ) without employing a link-
failure model. It is clear that, although a crucial first step
in the study of heterogeneous key predistribution schemes,
the assumption that all links are operational, i.e., reliable, is
not likely to hold in most practical settings. In this regard,
our work extends the results by Yag˘an [6] to more practical
WSN scenarios where the unreliability of links are taken into
account. In fact, by setting αn = 1 for each n = 1, 2, . . . (i.e.,
by assuming that all links are reliable), our results reduce to
those given in [6].
The reliability of secure WSNs was also studied in [13],
but under the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [2] where all sensors
receive the same number of keys. However, when the network
consists of sensors with varying level of resources (e.g.,
computational, memory, power) and/or with varying level of
security and connectivity requirements, it may no longer be
sensible to assign the same number of keys to all sensors.
Our work addresses this issue by generalizing [13] to the
cases where nodes can be assigned different number of keys.
When r = 1, i.e., when all nodes belong to the same class
and receive the same number of keys, our result recovers the
main result in [13].
Another notable work that is related to ours is by Zhao
et al. [12], who studied the k-connectivity and k-robustness
in the inhomogeneous random key graph. A graph is said to
be k-connected if it remains connected after removal (i.e.,
failure) of any k − 1 nodes. Thus, the results obtained in
[12] ensure the reliability of the network against the failure
of any k − 1 nodes, for some integer constant k. Since k-
vertex-connectivity implies k-edge-connectivity, the network
is ensured to be reliable against the failure of at least k − 1
edges, for some integer constant k. Our work complements
these results by considering the case when each and every
edge fails with probability 1−α, so that the total number of
failed links is possibly infinite; e.g., as many as O(n2) links
may fail.
C. Significance of the results
Our results are helpful in ensuring network reliability in
multitude of applications where inhomogeneous random key
graphs are utilized. For instance, reliability against the failure
of wireless links is important in WSN applications where
sensors are deployed in hostile environments (e.g., battlefield
surveillance), or, are unattended for long periods of time
(e.g., environmental monitoring), or, are used in life-critical
applications (e.g., patient monitoring).
Considering the asymptotic regime, a key question in
network reliability analysis is whether or not there exists
a threshold α∗n ∈ (0, 1) such that if αn is slightly smaller
than (resp. slightly larger than) α∗n then the probability that
G(n;µ,K, P, α) is connected is close to zero (resp. close
to one); e.g., see [9, Section 7.5]. Our results constitute an
asymptotic solution of the network reliability problem for
inhomogeneous random key graphs. More specifically, we
show that αn exhibits a threshold behavior as given at (6).
Although asymptotic in nature, these results can still provide
useful insights about the reliability of heterogeneous WSNs
with number of sensors n being on the order of hundreds;
see Section IV for numerical experiments.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present numerical results that support Theorem 3.1 and
Theorem 3.2 in the finite node regime. In all experiments, we
fix the number of nodes at n = 500 and the size of the key
pool at P = 104. To help better visualize the results, we use
the curve fitting tool of MATLAB. In Figure 1, we consider
the link-failure parameters α = 0.2, α = 0.4, α = 0.6, and
α = 0.8, while varying the parameter K1 (i.e., the smallest
key ring size) from 5 to 35. The number of classes is fixed at
4 with µ = {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25} and we set K2 = K1+5,
K3 = K1 + 10, and K4 = K1 + 15. For each parameter
pair (K,α), we generate 200 independent samples of the
graph G(n;µ,Θ) and count the number of times (out of a
possible 200) that the obtained graphs i) have no isolated
nodes and ii) are connected. Dividing the counts by 200, we
obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events of interest.
We observed that G(n;µ,Θ) is connected whenever it has
no isolated nodes yielding the same empirical probability
for both events. This is in parallel with the asymptotic
equivalence of the two properties as implied by Theorems
3.1 and 3.2.
In Figure 1 we show the critical threshold of connectivity
“predicted” by Theorem 3.2 by a vertical dashed line. More
specifically, the vertical dashed lines stand for the minimum
integer K1 such that
λ1(n) =
4∑
j=1
µj
(
1−
(
P−Kj
K1
)
(
P
K1
)
)
>
1
α
logn
n
. (10)
We see that the probability of connectivity transitions from
zero to one within relatively small variation of K1, with
critical values of K1 from (10) lying within this transition
interval.
Figure 2 is generated in a similar manner with Figure 1,
this time with an eye towards understanding the impact of
the minimum key ring size K1 on network reliability. To that,
we fix the number of classes at 2 with µ = {0.5, 0.5} and
consider four different key ring sizes K each with mean 30;
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that G(n;µ,K,P, α) is connected with n =
500, µ = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), K = (K1,K1 + 5,K1 + 10, K1 + 15),
and P = 104. Vertical dashed lines give the minimum K1 for which (10)
holds.
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that G(n;µ,K, P, α) is connected with
n = 500, µ = (1/2, 1/2), and P = 104; we consider four choices of
K = (K1,K2) each with the same mean. Vertical dashed lines give the
minimum α for which (10) holds.
namely, we consider K = {10, 70}, K = {20, 60}, K =
{30, 50}, and K = {40, 40}. As we compare the probability
of connectivity in the resulting networks with link failure
probability ranging from zero to one, we see that network
reliability improves dramatically as the minimum key ring
size K1 increases.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the method of first and
second moments applied to the number of isolated nodes
in G(n;µ,Θn). Let In(µ,Θn) denote the total number of
isolated nodes in G(n;µ,Θn), namely,
In(µ,Θn) =
n∑
ℓ=1
1[vℓ is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn)] (11)
The method of first moment [19, Eqn. (3.10), p. 55] gives
1− E[In(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn) = 0]
A. Preliminaries
Several technical results are collected here for conve-
nience. The first result is established in [6, Proposition 4.1]
and follows easily from the scaling condition (5): For any
scaling K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , we have
λ1(n) ≤ λ2(n) ≤ . . . ≤ λr(n) (12)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
Another useful bound that will be used throughout is
(1 ± x) ≤ e±x, x ∈ (0, 1) (13)
Finally, we find it useful to write
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x) (14)
where Ψ(x) =
∫ x
0
t
1−t
dt. From L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we have
lim
x→0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
−x− log(1 − x)
x2
=
1
2
. (15)
B. Establishing the one-law
It is clear that in order to establish the one-law, namely
that limn→∞ P [In(µ,Θn) = 0], we need to show that
limn→∞ E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0. Recalling (11), we have
E [In(µ,Θn)]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn) | t1 = i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP
[
∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = i
]
= n
r∑
i=1
µi (P [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i])
n−1 (16)
where (16) follows by the independence of the rvs {vj ≁
v1}nj=1 given Σ1. By conditioning on the class of v2, we
find
P[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i] =
r∑
j=1
µjP[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i, t2 = j]
=
r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αpij) = 1− Λi(n). (17)
Using (17) in (16), and recalling (12), (13) we obtain
E[In(µ,Θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µi (1− Λi(n))
n−1
≤ n (1− Λ1(n))
n−1
= n
(
1− cn
logn
n
)n−1
≤ elogn(1−cn
n−1
n )
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we immediately get
limn→∞ E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0 since limn→∞(1 − cn n−1n ) =
1 − c < 0 under the enforced assumptions (with c > 1) and
the one-law is established.
C. Establishing the zero-law
Our approach in establishing the zero-law relies on the
method of second moment applied to a variable that counts
the number of nodes that are class-1 and isolated. Clearly if
we can show that whp there exists at least one class-1 node
that is isolated under the enforced assumptions (with c < 1)
then the zero-law would immediately follow.
Let Yn(µ,Θn) denote the number of nodes that are class-1
and isolated in G(n;µ,Θn), and let
xn,i(µ,Θn) = 1[ti = 1 ∩ vi is isolated in G(n;µ,Θn)],
then we have Yn(µ,Θn) =
∑n
i=1 xn,i(µ,Θn). By applying
the method of second moments [19, Remark 3.1, p. 55] on
Yn(µ,Θn), we get
P[Yn(µ,Θn) = 0] ≤ 1−
E[Yn(µ,Θn)]
2
E[Yn(µ,Θn)2]
(18)
where
E[Yn(µ,Θn)] = nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] (19)
and
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2] =nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+ n(n− 1)E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
(20)
by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs
{xn,i(µ,Θn)}ni=1. Using (19) and (20), we get
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2]
E[Yn(µ,Θn)]2
=
1
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+
n− 1
n
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
Accordingly, in order to establish the zero-law, we need to
show that
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, (21)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)]2
)
≤ 1. (22)
The following propositions establish (21) and (22) which
in turn establish the zero-law.
Proposition 5.1: Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P :
N0 → N
r+1
0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (6)
holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, if c < 1
Proof. We have
nE [xn,1(µ,Θn)]
= nµ1P
[
∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = 1
]
= nµ1

 r∑
j=1
µjP [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = 1, t2 = j]


n−1
= nµ1

 r∑
j=1
µj(1 − αnp1j)


n−1
(23)
= nµ1 (1− Λ1(n))
n−1
= µ1e
βn (24)
where
βn = logn+ (n− 1) log(1 − Λ1(n))
= logn− (n− 1) (Λ1(n) + Ψ(Λ1(n)))
= logn− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
+Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
))
= logn
(
1− cn
n− 1
n
)
− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
)2 Ψ(cn lognn )(
cn
logn
n
)2 (25)
by virtue of (14). Now, recalling (15), we have
lim
n→∞
Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
)
(
cn
log n
n
)2 = 12 (26)
since cn lognn = o(1). Thus, βn = logn
(
1− cn
n−1
n
)
− o(1).
Using (24), (25), (26), and letting n go to infinity, we get
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞
whenever limn→∞ cn = c < 1.
Proposition 5.2: Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P :
N0 → N
r+1
0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (6)
holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have (22) if c < 1.
We omit the proof of Proposition 5.2 from this conference
version. All details can be found in [20].
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is lengthy and technically
involved. Therefore, we omit most of the details in this
conference version. All details can be found in [20]. In this
section, we present an outline of our proof. Let Cn(µ,Θn)
denote the event that the graph G(n,µ,Θn) is connected,
and with a slight abuse of notation, let In(µ,Θn) denote
the event that the graph G(n,µ,Θn) has no isolated nodes.
Clearly, if a random graph is connected then it does not have
any isolated node, hence Cn(µ,Θn) ⊆ In(µ,Θn) and we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn)] (27)
and
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c] = P[In(µ,Θn)
c] + P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)].
(28)
In view of (27), we obtain the zero-law for connectivity,
i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 0 if c < 1,
immediately from the zero-law part of Theorem 3.1, i.e.,
from that limn→∞ P[In(µ,Θn)] = 0 if c < 1. It remains
to establish the one-law for connectivity. From Theorem 3.1
and (28), we see that the one-law for connectivity, i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[G(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 1 if c > 1,
will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)] = 0. (29)
The proof of the one-law passes through obtaining a
proper upper bound for (29) and then showing that the
bound goes to zero as n gets to infinity (with c > 1)
under appropriate conditions of the parameter scalings. Due
to space limitations, the details of this technically involved
result are given in [20].
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